

Response to Rule 8 Request

My name is Patrick [REDACTED] Campbell. My date of birth is [REDACTED] 1971. My business address is Scottish Crime Campus, [REDACTED]

This is my response to a request under Rule 8 of the Inquiries (Scotland) Rules 2007.

1. I commenced duty as on call duty Detective Superintendent for the East of Scotland at 06:30 hrs on 3 May 2015. Later that morning I received a call on my police issue mobile telephone from Detective Chief Superintendent ['DCS'] Lesley Boal informing me of an ongoing incident in Kirkcaldy where a black male had been involved in an incident with a number of police officers and was unconscious.
2. "Major Investigation Protocols" cover a significant number of priority areas for Police and their partners responding to major incidents. These are detailed within a number of Police Scotland Standard Operating Procedures ['SOPs'], guidance material and also within College of Policing documentation. The protocols are a generic list/aide memoire of considerations for Police and their partners responding to a major Incident. My actions are detailed in my statements, day book and policy file. Detective Chief Inspector ['DCI'] Stuart Houston and Detective Inspector ['DI'] Colin Robson assisted me in undertaking this role. I was informed that it was to be a PIRC led investigation at about 10:20 hrs that same morning.
3. I was appointed senior investigating officer ['SIO'] by DCS Boal following her consultation with Assistant Chief Constable Ruaridh Nicolson (Gold Commander). The main responsibilities of an SIO include: strategic lead for the Investigation; development and implementation of strategies for forensics, witnesses, suspects and house-to-house inquiries; disclosure considerations; media 'single point of contact' ['SPOC'] for the Investigation; chair of operational and forensic strategy meetings; reporting directly to COPFS/PIRC; welfare and health and safety strategy; maintaining the integrity of the investigation; maintaining the SIO Policy file; and to effectively and competently lead the investigation.

I have received training relevant to the role of SIO provided by the Scottish Police College and the National Police Chiefs' Council ['NPCC'] College of Policing that all sit within the Policing Professional Standards Framework under National Occupational Standards. My training includes the following: initial detective training; advanced detective training; Senior Investigating Officer training courses; disclosure training; 'assisting offenders' training; and covert deployment and consideration relevant authorities under RIPA/RIPSA (Authorising Officer).

A full list of my training will be detailed in my SCOPE record.

I have extensive experience of leading Major Investigations over the past 25 years – including the attendance at scenes of homicide, and at responding to and leading on investigations in respect of death in custody following recent police contact.

I had all of these responsibilities, and others, as SIO in mind in my role as initial SIO in this matter. My actions are all described in my statements, day book and policy file. They will also be referred to in other documents before the inquiry, and should also be described in the day books and statements provided by other senior officers.



4. It is not the standard procedure to separate officers following an incident of this nature. This is not a "one size fits all" approach; instead, consideration requires to be given to the circumstances of each incident. This includes balancing the welfare needs of the officers with the needs of the enquiry (see, for example, Police Scotland, Post Incident Procedures SOP published 30/03/2013). All officers were reminded by me not to discuss the incident, which also would have been made clear by line management with the support of Chief Superintendent McEwan, his Senior Management Team, and the support offered by PC Amanda Givan.

This allowed me to be confident that there were sufficient control measures in place to meet the needs of the enquiry, while the officers' welfare was being supported. It should be noted that there were no grounds for suspecting any criminal or disciplinary conduct had occurred at this time. There were also, to a lesser extent, wider considerations around the practicalities of separation – given the location of the officers within Kirkcaldy police station, the number of officers as well as the resources required to achieve effective separation.

In respect of the officer Nicole Short – I am unsure if she was present when I addressed all the officers within the canteen/break area of Kirkcaldy police office. I was aware that she had attended hospital immediately after incident. I spoke to the officers at approximately 11:30 hrs. I did not ask if they had previously discussed the incident with anyone within the group.

5. This decision was not based on, or influenced in anyway, by Mr Bayoh's race or perceived race.
6. Yes – I made it very clear to all officers I addressed within the canteen that under no circumstances should they discuss the incident with anyone at that time. This was also emphasised by the Post Incident Manager, CI Conrad Trickett. I did not ask the officers concerned if they had previously been provided with any additional direction around not conferring. I was aware that they were accompanied within the break room/canteen by both PC Givan and CI Trickett who were both aware of the guidance and direction around non-conferral and both further emphasised this to officers.
7. I did not ask the officers if they had already discussed the incident – but emphasised the need for this not to occur at any time.
8. At no point during my time with the officers was I aware of any officer discussing this incident.
9. This is an accurate comment of my direction to the officers.
10. I instructed DCI Houston to take on the role as Scene Co-ordinator and to also oversee (with relevant staff) the recovery of the officers clothing, footwear and Officer Safety Equipment – under sterile conditions and with strict adherence to ensure no cross-contamination between officers.
11. I discussed this in detail with DCI Houston and identified a suitable sterile room that could be used for this purpose, as well as the required process to be adopted. This was around managing the recovery of each officer's clothing, footwear and officer safety equipment

individually and to ensure we had adequate resources to assist DCI Houston with this process. This strategy was developed by DCI Houston, which I endorsed along with Keith Harrower (PIRC). Further details are provided in the Forensic Strategy Document.

12. I recall that the body armour and other equipment was in the canteen/break room.
13. No
14. No
15. There were no questions asked from the officers regarding what I had explained. I had discussed the matter of requiring statements of the officers with PC Givan prior to addressing the officers, and she had informed me that the officers had been advised not to provide any statements prior to obtaining legal advice.
16. In the morning of 3 May 2015 I was informed by Keith Harrower (PIRC) that the officers were to be treated as witnesses. This was a PIRC led investigation and the authority around the status of individuals involved in this incident rested with the PIRC through consultation with COPFS.
17. Yes – the status of the officers was discussed briefly at the initial Gold Meeting on 3 May 2015 chaired by ACC Nicolson. DI Robson and I presented the initial investigative update/overview and, as part of that, provided an update around the status of the officers. All members of the Gold Group agreed that the officers were witnesses at this stage and not suspects. To the best of my recollection, DI Robson took notes of this meeting.
18. No. I did not hear any such discussions taking place.
19. Yes – I requested that officers were to provide operational statements during my initial address to them in the canteen/break area. This was a general request to all officers that this would be required as part of the investigation. I did not address each officer individually about this matter. Neither PC Givan, nor any other officer, responded to this direction; however, as previously indicated, I was aware that the advice to officers was not to provide operational statements prior to seeking legal advice. As SIO, the overarching request for a statement to be provided would be initiated by me.
20. Yes – I informed Keith Harrower of what advice had been given by PC Givan around not providing operational statements. I did not hear PC Givan giving this advice to the officers concerned; she informed me that she had provided this direction prior to me addressing the officers within the canteen/break area. I informed PC Givan that, although she had provided this advice, I would still be requesting operational statements from the officers as they were being treated as witnesses. I did not facilitate a meeting between Keith Harrower and PC Givan. He was aware of what advice she had provided to the officers and could easily have spoken to her on this matter. I am not sure if they spoke on this issue. I informed the officers that they were being treated as witnesses.

21. It is not the responsibility of the SIO to ensure that officers complete their notebooks. This is an area of personal responsibility for all police officers – supported by their immediate line management.
22. It is not the responsibility of the SIO to ensure that all officers complete the necessary paperwork surrounding their deployment or attendance at any specific incident. This, again, is the personal responsibility of individual officers – supported by their immediate line management.
23. I had a meeting with William Little, Ricky Casey both from PIRC and DCI Keith Hardie from Police Scotland, in respect of providing an update – for welfare and wellbeing purposes – to the officers involved. A 'form of words' was agreed at this time between myself and the PIRC representatives. This was, ultimately, the investigation being handed over completely to the PIRC, at 7:30 p.m. on 4 May 2015. I passed this form of words to update the officers involved to Chief Superintendent Garry McEwan, as Divisional Commander, to make contact, personally, with the officers and update them accordingly. CS McEwan updated me later that evening that he had delivered the update to all concerned officers.
24. No. This was a live issue through the course of the day. However, it was not the immediate priority: I had other pressing matters in respect of the strategic oversight of the investigation.
25. The decisions made by myself around the requirement to provide operational statements was not in any way influenced by Mr Bayoh's race or perceived race.

I have answered these questions to the best of my recollection, but without access to all relevant material. Notwithstanding this, I believe the facts in this witness statement are true. I understand that this statement may form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and be published on the Inquiry's website.



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